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1. THE MAKING OF MIRRORS 
In Spring 1801, absolute idealism materialised in Jena as the 
shared project of F.W.J. Schelling and G.W.F. Hegel. Central to it 
were the critique of contemporary philosophy as “reflective” and 
the assertion of a new “speculative standpoint”—even if the very 
constitution of the meanings of “reflection,” “speculation” and their 
relationship was a task that consumed the subsequent years. For 
what followed over the next fifty years was  (in part)  a  series of 
experiments in speculative philosophy, attempts to model thinking 
as a “magical and symbolic mirror.” 
  The  concepts  of  both  reflection  and  speculation  gain  their 
sense from the workings of the mirror: its ontology of original and 
image  (which  both  is  and  is  not  the  original)  and  its  evaluative 
criteria  of  fidelity  (seeing  face-to-face)  and  inaccuracy  (seeing 
darkly).  The  description  of  thought  as  mirror  (while  traditional) 
takes  on  a  new  urgency  from  1801  onwards  in  the  task  of 
differentiating between two types of mirror: a narcissistic, reflective 
mirror which is to be avoided and a magical, speculative mirror 
which  all  philosophers  must  strive  to  silver.  What  distinguishes 
these  types  of  mirror—that  is,  the  conditions  of  silvering  that 
account  for  the  transition  from  reflection  to  speculation—are 
Schelling and Hegel’s concerns. 
  What  is  more,  it  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  that  what 
concretely constitute these mirrors are the philosopher and her text. 
It  is  for  the  philosopher  to  think  and  write  in  such  a  way  that 
reality reflects itself in a speculative rather than merely reflective 
manner. It is for the philosopher to silver herself so as to become 
speculative.  Behind  Hegel  and  Schelling’s  appropriation  of  this 
optical imagery therefore lie the questions: how does one become a 
speculative philosopher? What practices and exercises are required GLOSSATOR 7 
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to transform oneself and one’s writing from a reflective state to a 
speculative one? In other words, in what do speculative forms of 
life consist? 
  In what follows, I consider two passages from Schelling’s later 
work  in  which  he  attempts  to  model  a  speculative  form  of  life. 
What is most revealing about these examples of “the formation of 
the speculative”
1 is that Schelling’s chosen dialogue partners are 
not  canonical  philosophers,  but  heretical  mystics:  Böhme  and 
Swedenborg. In order to theorise the becoming-speculative of the 
philosophical mirror, Schelling resorts to mystical texts; and yet he 
is  always  clear—although  for  very  different  reasons  at  different 
moments—mysticism is only a dialogue partner. The mystical text 
cannot be the answer, even if it does still point the philosopher on 
her way. 
 
Consideration  of  a  passage  repeated  in  both  the  Lectures  on 
Philosophy  of  Art  and  the  Lectures  on  Method  (On  University 
Studies) will help bring out further the key issues at  play in this 
recourse  to  mysticism.  Schelling  writes,  “Art  contemplates  the 
intimate essence of the science of the absolute (philosophy) as in a 
magical and symbolic mirror.”
2 The artistic medium reflects—and 
so mediates—philosophical ideas. And there is, of course, also an 
art  to  philosophising  itself:  the  philosopher  too  must  hold  up  a 
mirror  to  her  thinking  through  the  written  or  spoken  word. 
Articulation  is  necessarily  mediation.  So,  one  of  the  stakes  in 
philosophising  is  the  nature  of  the  philosopher’s  mirror—what  it 
reflects and how it reflects it. That is, what is at stake is how the 
mirror  is  manufactured,  the  silvering  process  that  goes  into  its 
creation.  The  art  of  the  philosopher  includes  the  art  of  making 
mirrors as well as looking into them—the production of “that dull 
surface  without  which  no  reflection  and  no  specular  and 
speculative activity would be possible.”
3 The philosopher mediates 
                                                                                                               
1 F.W.J. Schelling, Briefe und Dokumente vol. 2, ed. Horst Fuhrmans (Bonn: 
Bouvier, 1962-75), 436. 
2 F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophy of Art, trans. Douglas W. Stott (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 8; On University Studies, trans. E.S. 
Morgan (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1966), 150. 
3 Rodolphe Gasché, The Tain  of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of 
Reflection (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 6. In many 
ways, what follows is an implicit commentary on the opening to Gasché’s WHISTLER – SILVERING 
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reality through herself and her text—and it is not just the success of 
such mediation that distinguishes a good from a bad philosopher, it 
is also the type of mediation she forges in the first place. 
However, as the above quotation implies, the philosopher still 
possesses a quite unique relation to her ideas: for while the artist 
can  only  reflect  on  such  ideas  from  without,  the  philosopher 
reflects what she already thinks. The philosopher stands in both a 
mediated  and  immediate  relation  to  philosophy.  What  Hyppolite 
writes  of  Hegelian  thought  applies  to  the  above  too:  “The 
immediate itself reflects itself, and this identity of reflection and the 
immediate corresponds to philosophical knowledge as such.”
4 In 
other words, the artist is forever attempting in vain to recover a lost 
immediacy; the philosopher negotiates an immediacy always already 
present. Schelling’s acknowledgement of this presence is seemingly 
what forces him to begin with philosophy already presupposed—
that is, to philosophise “like a shot from a pistol” or to “fall head 
over heels into the absolute.”
5  
And yet, as this essay progresses, we will come to see Schelling 
criticise  precisely  this  philosophical  illusion  of  the  givenness  of 
thought.  That  is,  the  above  proposes  an  idealist  fiction:  that 
thought is given first (and given first to the philosopher alone). And 
while he remains committed to this fiction, Schelling will never tire 
of  putting  it  into  question  as  well.
6  Throughout his  work s,  he 
uncovers the pre-philosophical, pre-textual practices that give rise 
to thought. Ideas are mediated and reflected prior to philosophy. 
Hence, while  to  the  philosopher  thought  appears  immediate,  such 
immediacy  depends  on  the  forgetting  of  the  very  process  of 
becoming-philosophical  (the  Bildung  of  the  philosopher  or  “the 
formation of the speculative”). 
                                                                                                               
work and his marginalisation of Schelling’s role in “the formation of the 
speculative.” See especially ibid., 23-4. 
4 Jean Hyppolite, Logic and Existence, trans. Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), 84-5; this translation from Gasché, The Tain 
of the Mirror, 34. 
5 Respectively: G.W.F. Hegel,  Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), §27; Frederick C. Beiser, German 
Idealism:  The  Struggle  against  Subjectivism  1781-1801  (Cambridge,  MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2002), 588. 
6  Implicit here is a rejection of any simplistic distinction between the 
“early”, idealist Schelling and the “late”, critical Schelling. GLOSSATOR 7 
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Already a tangled dialectic is emerging—and this tangle will 
only  increase  as  we  weave  our  way  through  Schelling’s 
engagements  with  mysticism.  Philosophical  ideas  are  immediate 
but  need  to  be  mediated  to  retain  their  immediacy.  This  is  the 
necessity of silvering or the requisite indifference of mediacy and 
immediacy—the speculative ideal. At the same time, such immediacy 
is also dependent on prior practices of becoming-philosophical in 
the first place (breeding speculative forms of life). Immediacy is 
dependent on both prior and posterior mediation to be articulated 
as  immediacy—and  what  is  more  it  is  also  dependent  on  the 
philosophical forgetting of precisely these practices. What follows is 
(to some extent, at least) a survey of the ways in which Schelling 
encounters the mystical text in order to remember—to remember, that 
is,  the  vast  panoply  of  mediations  necessary  for  philosophical 
claims  to  immediacy.  Together  these  recovered  exercises  in 
mediation form the art of immediacy. 
I  argue,  however,  that  it  is  Schelling’s  recovery  of  the  pre-
philosophical practices of mediation in particular which constitute 
his  most  significant  achievement  in  this  regard.  As  the  above 
analysis of Schelling’s appeal to “the magical and symbolic mirror” 
of  speculation  has  already  made  clear,  it  is  these  extra-textual 
exercises  that  are  most  prone  to  be  forgotten.  I  contend  that 
Schelling’s  relative  neglect  of  them  in  his  analysis  of  Böhme’s 
mysticism  gives  rise  to  some  of  the  instability  in  his  attitude  to 
theosophy during the 1830s and 40s, while his metaphilosophical 
reflections in Clara (with Swedenborg as exemplar) give rise to a 
more fruitful idea of the life the philosopher must live to become 
speculative. 
 
2.  BECOMING-SPECULATIVE:  HEGEL  AND  SCHELLING’S  COMMON 
PROJECT 
When  embarking  on  his  Naturphilosophie  in  1797,  Schelling 
saw speculation as a sickness, a by-product of man’s sentimental 
alienation from nature: 
 
Mere  speculation,  therefore,  is  a  spiritual  sickness  in 
mankind,  and  moreover  the  most  dangerous  of  all, 
which kills the germ of man’s existence and uproots his 
being  .  .  .  Every  weapon  is  justifiable  against  a 
philosophy which makes speculation not a means but an 
end. For it torments human reason with chimeras which, WHISTLER – SILVERING 
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because they lie beyond all reason, it is not even possible 
to combat. It makes that separation between man and 
the world permanent.
7 
 
One speculates only when cast adrift. The task of the philoso pher 
is  thus  the  annihilation  of  speculation,  which  is  also  the 
annihilation of philosophy itself  (and ultimately consciousness). 
Very quickly, however, Schelling found himself dissatisfied with 
such  terminology  and  by  1799  “speculation”  gained  a  very 
different  valence:  it  became  the  ideal  towards  which 
Naturphilosophie  moved—the  perfection  of  this  branch  of  the 
philosophical enterprise is dubbed a “speculative physics.”
8 At the 
same  time,  Schelling  begins  to  formulate  more  determinately  a 
form of philosophising opposed to speculation, one that embodies 
all that is wrong with how we usually think—“reflection.” Reflection 
is the abject other of speculation, and it is the former rather than 
the  latter  that  now  designates  a  spiritual  sickness  in  which  the 
subject is alienated from the object, preventing secure knowledge. 
Hence,  the  1803  edition  of  the  Ideas  for  a  Philosophy  of  Nature 
exactly inverts the 1797 passage: 
 
As soon as man sets himself in opposition to the external 
world. . . reflection first begins; he separates from now 
on what nature had always united, separates the object 
from the intuition, the concept from the image, finally 
himself from himself . . . Mere reflection, therefore, is a 
spiritual  sickness  in  mankind,  the  more  so  when  it 
imposes himself in dominion over the whole man, and 
kills at the root what in germ is his highest being, his 
spiritual life, which issues only from identity.
9 
 
                                                                                                               
7 F.W.J. Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, trans. Errol E. Harris and 
Peter  Heath  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1988),  11.  The 
1797 variant is printed in a footnote. 
8 F.W.J. Schelling, Introduction to the System of a Philosophy of Nature in First 
Outline  of  a  System  of  the  Philosophy  of  Nature,  trans.  Keith  R.  Peterson 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2004), 195. 
9 Schelling, Ideas, 10-11. For a detailed account of the above, see Klaus 
Düsing, “Spekulation und Reflexion: Zur Gesammenarbeit Schellings und 
Hegels in Jena,” in Hegel-Studien 5 (1969). GLOSSATOR 7 
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At  the  turn  of  the  century,  the  conceptual  pairing 
reflection/speculation  orientated  Schelling’s  approach  to 
philosophy. Nevertheless, the idea of speculation and its relation to 
reflection remains underdetermined in Schelling’s writings
10—until, 
that is, the Spring of 1801 and the arrival of Hegel in Jena as a 
collaborative  partner.  A  more  substantial  conception  of  the 
reflection/speculation  binary  seems  to  have  emerged  in 
conversation; it is first hinted at in Schelling’s Presentation published 
in  May  1801;
11  then  fully  elaborated  in  Hegel’s  Differenzschrift 
released in September. 
Initially  at  least,  speculation  and  reflection  are  to  be 
understood  as  opposed:  “Since,  for  speculation,  cognition  has 
reality only within the absolute, what is cognised and known in the 
reflective  mode  of  expression  and  therefore  has  a  determinate 
form,  becomes  nothing  in  the  presence  of  speculation.”
12 
Speculating is equated with doing philosophy well and getting at 
the truth; reflective thought plunges into error. It is a sickness to be 
cured with the medicine of the speculative standpoint. Moreover, 
first  and  foremost,  this  sickness  takes  the  form  of  narcissism.  In 
reflection, “I remain entirely self-obsessed . . . I never get away 
from  myself,”  never  “leave  the  circle  of  consciousness.”
13  The 
mirror-image shows no more than what was present to begin with—
and usually rather less. A reflective philosopher therefore becomes 
trapped  in  the  continual  repetition  of  the  same—an  “inevitable 
vicious circle”
14 of sterile limitation: “In its striving to enlarge itself 
                                                                                                               
10 See Düsing, “Spekulation und Reflexion,” 116. 
11  In  the  Preface,  Schelling  employs  “speculation”  positively  (F.W.J. 
Schelling, Presentation of my System of Philosophy, trans. Michael G. Vater in 
Philosophical  Forum  32.4  [2001],  346)  and  denigrates  “the  standpoint  of 
reflection,”  associating  it  with  thinking  from  antitheses  (ibid.,  348)  and 
Fichtean idealism (ibid., 345). In the main body of the work, he goes on to 
contrast what is “for reflection or in appearance” with “the standpoint of 
reason” (ibid., 351). 
12  G.W.F. Hegel,  The  Difference  between  Fichte’s  and  Schelling’s  System  of 
Philosophy,  trans.  H.S.  Harris  and  Walter  Cerf  (Albany:  SUNY  Press, 
1977), 99. 
13 F.W.J. Schelling,  Werke, vol. 4, ed. K.F.A. Schelling (Stuttgart: Cotta, 
1856-61), 81. 
14 Ibid. WHISTLER – SILVERING 
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into the absolute, the intellect only reproduces itself ad infinitum 
and so mocks itself.”
15 
  On the other hand, the speculative mirror breaks out of the 
vicious, nihilistic circle of reflection. It gains access to “the great 
outdoors”  behind  the  looking-glass—and  it  is  to  this  extent,  of 
course, that the mirror is, as Schelling calls it, “magical.” What is 
reflected in the speculative mirror is not just the philosopher gazing 
in,  but  the  totality  of  reality.  But  this  is  already  to  implicitly 
question  the  possibility  of  such  a  speculative  mirror:  is  such  a 
mirror  “magical”  because  it  is  in  fact  a  phantasy  of  intellectual 
desire? Is there any way to silver a mirror such that it would do 
what Schelling and Hegel hope for? Put simply, how is speculation 
to be achieved? Schelling and Hegel’s early answer runs as follows: 
the great outdoors is not to be accessed by smashing through the 
glass, but instead through radicalising the mirror’s limitations, its 
ineluctable  insistence  on reflecting back the same.
16 There is no 
immediate path to speculation: it is to be captu red by diversions, 
strategies and feints. Out of such concerns emerges the ideal of 
“mediated  immediacy”—and,  as  this  paper  proceeds,  a  very 
Schellingian variant of such mediated immediacy will emerge: an 
art of speculation. 
 
Reflection is defined by dichotomy. “Reflection works only from 
oppositions and rests on oppositions.”
17 In particular, the reflective 
mirror is that which distinguishes original from image. In so doing, 
it establishes a hierarchy between the two: the original becomes 
conceived as ontologically prior to the image and so the cause of 
the latter. It is here that Hegel and Schelling pinpoint the genesis of 
cause and effect and the type of mechanical thinking that is based 
upon them—“an eternal and flowing source of error.”
18 Speculation 
rejects  all  these  dichotomies  and  hierarchies  by  asserting  the 
ultimate  identity  of  original  and  image.  As  Hegel  categorically 
states it, “the principle of speculation is the identity of subject and 
                                                                                                               
15 Hegel, Difference, 89-90. 
16 Hence Meillassoux criticises Hegel and Schelling for not breaking out of 
the correlation, but absolutising it. The great outdoors becomes the “great” 
indoors in a theorisation of total immanence. See Quentin Meillassoux, 
After Finitude, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2009), 37-8. 
17 Schelling, Presentation, 348. 
18 Schelling, Werke, 4:343-4. GLOSSATOR 7 
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object.”
19  No  duality  emerges;  instead,  there  is  a  sort  of 
participatory  metaphysics  in  which  each  image  is  reality  in  a 
specific  form—and  the  aggregate  of  such  images  presents  the 
absolute, the totality of reality: 
 
Reason does not recall its appearance, which emanates 
from it as a duplicate, back into itself—for then, it would 
only  nullify  it.  Rather,  reason  constructs  itself  in  its 
emanation as an identity that is conditioned by this very 
duplicate; it opposes this relative identity to itself once 
more,  and  in  this  way  the  system  advances  until  the 
objective totality is completed. Reason then unites this 
objective totality with the opposite subjective totality to 
form the infinite world intuition, whose expansion has at 
the same time contracted into the richest and simplest 
identity.
20 
  
Such a process of gathering together constitutes speculation itself, 
for all of reality now appears to the philosopher in her self -forged, 
magical mirror. 
  Three aspects of this programme for becoming -speculative 
require  note.  First,  speculation  is  to  be  distinguished  from 
reflection  in  terms  of  its  achievement  of  totality.  Speculation 
“carries  totality  within  itself”
21  in  contrast  to  the  “arbitrary 
separation  of  the  individual  from  the  whole  effected  by 
reflection.”
22 As a collection of all possible images of the absolute, 
the  speculative  text  is  nothing  less  than  the  absolute  itself. 
Speculation is all-encompassing: nothing is left out—not even, as we 
shall see, ghost stories and angelic realms.
23 
  Second, the identity of the original with its image is once 
again mediated, rather  than  immediate.  This  is  “the  identity  of 
identity  and  non-identity”  proclaimed  by  Hegel  in  the 
                                                                                                               
19 Hegel, Difference, 80. 
20 Ibid., 113. 
21 Ibid., 89. 
22 Schelling, Presentation, 357. 
23 C.f. Grant’s conception of an “extensity test” for an absolute system. Iain 
Hamilton Grant, Philosophies of Nature after Schelling (London: Continuum, 
2006), 19-21. WHISTLER – SILVERING 
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Differenzschrift and Schelling in Bruno and the Further Presentations.
24 
On the one hand, reflective thinking fixates on one particular 
image, thereby implicitly affirming the non -identity of such an 
image with reality as a whole. Here, “nonidentity is raised to an 
absolute  principle.”
25  On  the  other  hand,  the  speculative 
philosopher is able to raise herself to totality so as to incorporate 
the particular image into a system. Speculation is only achieved by 
means of progressive systematisation.
26 
  Third,  this  emphasis  on  the  multiplicity  of  images  in 
speculation (as opposed to reflective thinking’s fixation on one) is 
of  a  piece  with  siding  with  life  over  death.  The  reflective 
understanding  kills,  because  it  places  all  phenomena  in  “static, 
dead pigeonholes;”
27 speculative reason, however, gives rise to life, 
since  it  describes  a  process  of  becoming.
28  What  is seemingly 
forgotten, though, in Hegel and Schelling’s early assertions on the 
supremacy of life is the necessity of mediation. The affirmation of 
life needs to be mediated through its opposite, death, and in Part 
Four  of  this  paper  I  will  reconstruct  Schelling’s  argument  that 
death (or the philosophical simulation of suicide) is a precondition 
for speculative philosophising. 
 
                                                                                                               
24  Hegel,  Difference,  156;  F.W.J.  Schelling,  Bruno,  or  On  the  Natural  and 
Divine Principle in Things, trans. Michael G. Vater (Albany: SUNY Press, 
1984), 192; Schelling, Werke, 4:431. 
25 Hegel, Difference, 81. See Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror, 26. 
26 For Hegel, this achievement is reflection's own doing – it negates itself by 
pursuing  its  own  end  absolutely.  Reflection  “has  thrown  itself  into  the 
abyss  of  its  own  perfection”  (Difference,  140),  he  writes,  and  thereby 
becomes  “speculative  reflection”  (ibid.,  174),  so  that  “philosophy  [is]  a 
totality  of  knowledge  produced  by  reflection”  (ibid.,  103).  For  Hegel, 
therefore, speculation and reflection are not ultimately as opposed as they 
first  appear.  This  is  one  of  the  points  at  which  Schelling  and  Hegel 
diverge: for Schelling, reflection has “only negative value” (Schelling, Ideas, 
11). 
27 Hegel, Difference, 80. 
28 Ibid., 91. See also the language of life and death in G.W.F. Hegel and 
F.W.J. Schelling, “The Critical Journal of Philosophy: Introduction on the 
Essence of Philosophical Criticism Generally and its Relationship to the 
Present State of Philosophy in Particular,” in George di Giovanni and H.S. 
Harris (eds.), Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian 
Idealism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985). GLOSSATOR 7 
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Such—broadly—are the features of speculation and reflection as they 
emerge  in  Schelling  and  Hegel’s  writings  at  the  turn  of  the 
nineteenth century. However, so far I have said very little, for it is 
difficult to see at first blush how the above connects with concrete 
philosophical  practice.  What  does  it  mean,  for  example,  for  the 
philosopher  to  posit  the  identity  of  original  and  image?  What 
would this look like in a philosophical text? It is at this point that a 
plurality of interpretations accumulates. It is precisely here that the 
endeavour  to  silver  a  speculative  mirror  becomes  a  matter  of 
experimentation. In what follows, I pursue two such experiments 
from  later  in  Schelling’s  career  in  which  he  attempts  to  make 
clearer  what  speculative  silvering  might  look  like—and,  in 
particular,  what  exactly  the  philosophical  art  of  mediating  to 
produce immediacy might consist in. At stake, therefore, are rules 
for the construction of good philosophy—and it is at this point that 
the role of the mystical text in German Idealism takes centre-stage. 
 
3. THE ART OF IMMEDIACY: WHERE BÖHME WENT WRONG 
The mystic most often associated with Schelling’s philosophy 
is  Jakob  Böhme—and  and  it  is  certainly  true  that  Schelling’s 
engagement with his work was long, intense and eventful. Schelling 
was introduced to Böhme by Tieck in 1799; he obtained a copy of 
his works in 1804 and became infatuated by him by 1809.
29 As 
Cyril  O’Regan  puts  it  of  the  period  around  1809,  “many  of 
Schelling’s  texts  read  almost  as  if  they  are  paraphrases  of 
Böhme.”
30  Böhme  is  the  Muse  of  the  middle  period,  even  if 
between 1807 and 1820 Schelling never once mentions his name.
31 
In what follows, however, I consider the return Schelling makes to 
                                                                                                               
29 On the context of Schelling’s early reading of Böhme, see Paola Mayer, 
Jena  Romanticism  and  its  Appropriation  of  Böhme  (Montreal:  McGill 
University Press, 1999). 
30 Cyril O’Regan, The Heterodox Hegel (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 462. 
31  This  makes  the  task  of  assessing  the  extent  of  Böhme’s  influence 
particularly difficult. In the Anglo-American literature, Robert Brown’s The 
Later  Philosophy  of  Schelling:  The  Influence  of  Böhme  on  Schelling’s  Works  of 
1809-15  (Lewisburg:  Bucknell  University  Press,  1977)  affirms  Böhme’s 
influence enthusiastically. In Germany, however, the 1970s saw a reaction 
against  the  Böhmean  Schelling:  Harold  Holz,  Spekulation  und  Faktizitat: 
Zum Freiheitsbegriff in des mittleren und späten Schelling (Bonn: Bouvier, 1970); 
Werner  Beierwaltes,  Platonismus  und  Idealismus  (Frankfurt  am  Main: 
Klostermann, 1972). WHISTLER – SILVERING 
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Böhme’s work at a much later date in his career—the 1830s and 
40s. Here, rather than talking like Böhme, Schelling talks about him, 
and, what is more, he talks about Böhme’s work in terms of the 
very kind of mediated immediacy that had been set out as the goal 
of speculative thought as far back as 1801. 
  The 1841/42 Lectures on the Philosophy of Revelation were to be 
the crowning achievement of Schelling’s career. In Summer 1841, 
the  King  of  Prussia  summoned  Schelling  to  Berlin  to  slay  “the 
legions sprung from the teeth of Hegel’s pantheistic dragon” (as the 
King’s own letter put it)
32—and the Lectures were the immediate 
result.  They  opened  with  a  who’s-who  of  nineteenth-century 
intellectuals in attendance (Bakunin, Burkhardt, Engels, Alexander 
von Humboldt, Kierkegaard, Ranke, Savigny, Trendelenburg), but 
ended  heaped  in  derision.  Indeed,  H.E.G.  Paulus  published  a 
pirated edition of the lectures for the very purpose of ridiculing 
them.
33  In supplementary footnotes, Paulus berates Schellingian 
positive  philosophy  as  succumbing  to  the  worst  excesses  of 
theosophy—implicitly  linking  Schelling’s  name  to  Böhme’s  once 
more.
34 
Schelling had a twofold response to Pau lus’s piracy: first, to 
sue him; second, to add a new section to the lectures determining 
his  relation  to  Böhmean  theosophy  more  precisely.  Hence,  the 
Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  Revelation  of  1842/43  include  an 
additional  lecture  which  explicitly  picks  up  on  the  accusations: 
“Have  I  myself  not  provided  the  impetus  to  bring  positive 
philosophy into contact with theosophy?”
35 
                                                                                                               
32 Quoted in Alan White, Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 146. 
33 Republished (without Paulus’ editorial interjections) as F.W.J. Schelling, 
Philosophie  der  Offenbarung  1841/42,  ed.  Manfred  Frank  (Frankfurt  am 
Main:  Suhrkamp,  1977).  For  accounts  of  the  Paulus-affair,  see  Frank, 
“Einleitung”  to  ibid.,  46-52;  Xavier  Tilliette,  Schelling:  Biographie  (Paris: 
Calmann-Lévy, 1999), 351, 354-7. 
34  Bakunin,  Engels,  Leroux  and  Ruge  also  commented  on  Schelling’s 
proximity  to  theosophy.  See  the  extracts  in  Schelling,  Philosophie  der 
Offenbarung 1841/42, 542, 546, 552. For Engels, see his “Anti-Schelling” 
(http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1841/anti-
schelling/index.htm; last accessed: 09/12/12), passim. 
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  There is much in Schelling’s reading of Böhme that reflects 
standard philosophical prejudices against mysticism.  A glance  at 
Schelling’s treatment of Böhmean theosophy in his 1833 Lectures on 
the History of Modern Philosophy makes this “standard” attitude most 
clear.  Here  theosophers,  like  Böhme,  are  characterised  as 
“philosophers of not-knowing”
36: instead of argument, they employ 
“ecstatic  intuition  and  immediate  revelation.”
37  In  this  state  of 
immediate  ecstasy,  “language  and  knowledge  cease”  and  “all 
communication of knowledge [becomes] impossible.”
38 Such is the 
problem  of  articulation  that  plagues  mystical  thinking:  the  very 
immediacy of the experience of God which is the mystic’s greatest 
asset becomes her downfall when it comes to communicating this 
experience—or  even  preserving  it  in  clear  concepts.  Mystical 
experience  is  incapable  of  the  mediation  appropriate  to 
articulation. As Schelling puts it, “all experience, feeling, vision is 
in itself mute and needs a mediating organ to be expressed.”
39 For 
the  theosopher,  though,  mediation  is  conceived  as  an  external, 
destructive  agent  which  pollutes  the  privileged  experience  with 
which she began. In consequence, Schelling concludes, “the true 
mark of mysticism is the hatred of clear knowledge.”
40 Böhme and 
other  theosophists  fail  to  attain  the  speculative  ideal  of  the 
indifference  of  mediacy  and  immediacy—and  hence,  it  is  no 
surprise  that  Schelling  criticises  them  by  returning  to  mirror 
imagery: they do not “place [experience] firmly before [them] . . . 
to look at it in the understanding as in a mirror (in reflection).”
41 
The  speculative  philosopher,  on  the  other  hand,  realises  the 
following: 
 
Everything . . . must first be brought to real reflection, in 
order to achieve the highest representation. Here, then, 
lies  the  border  between  theosophy  and  philosophy 
which the lover of science will chastely seek to preserve, 
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Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 179. 
37 Ibid., 181. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 185. 
40 Ibid. 
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without being led astray by the apparent wealth of the 
material in the theosophical systems.
42 
 
The philosopher must not run scared of mirrors as the theosopher 
does. 
 
When  Schelling  returns  to  Böhme  once  more  in  the  1842/43 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Revelation, such a critique still plays its 
part, but something very different is now going on as well. A sense 
of  Schelling’s  new  project  of  positive  philosophy  is  required  to 
discern this. 
The  task  of  the  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  Revelation  is  to 
obtain  knowledge  of  the  divine  as  actually  existing  (i.e.  as 
historically, rather than logically becoming). In  other words, the 
requirement is to cultivate a state of rational ecstasy where God is 
encountered  not  as  a  concept  of  thought,  but  as  a  freely  acting 
person. Positive philosophy leaves behind a philosophy of logic for 
a philosophy of existence, of freedom and of life. Thus on the one 
hand, Schelling mounts a critique of all previous philosophy as too 
rationalistic. Such philosophy has possessed no relation to concrete 
existence in the world: “Rational philosophy . . . is so independent 
of existence that it would be true even if nothing existed.”
43 Hegel 
is of course the target of this attack. His system, Schelling claims, 
remains  stuck  within  thought:  it  is  “empty,  logical”  and  “an 
unbridgeable  chasm  [separates]  logical  necessity  and  reality.”
44 
And  so,  on  the  other  hand,  Schelling  attempts  to  set  out  the 
method for a non-logical philosophy, one that does access concrete 
being and so escapes the confines of thought. This philosophy does 
not  begin  in  thought  but  outside  it.  Positive  philosophy  thus 
demands that reason be “set outside itself, absolutely ecstatic”
45; it 
demands that reason “become motionless, paralysed . . . in order 
that  through  this  subordination  reason  may  reach  its  true  and 
eternal  content.”
46  And  this  true  content  is  “extralogical 
existence.”
47 
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It  should  be  obvious  how  and  why  Böhmean  theosophy  could 
serve as a useful guide here. Böhme’s visions of the divine make 
claim  to  the  same  kind  of  ecstasis  as  positive  philosophy.  They 
assume immediate access to the processes God actually undergoes, 
free  of  the  dross  of  scholastic  metaphysics.  Böhmean  mysticism 
accesses  the  divine  through  apparently  immediate  experience. 
Schelling’s  characterisation  of  Böhmean  thought  in  the  1842/43 
Lectures recognises this, 
 
In a third type of empiricism, the supersensible is made 
into  an  object  of  actual  experience  through  which  a 
possible  ecstasy  of  the  human  essence  in  God  is 
assumed,  the  consequence  of  which  is  a  necessary, 
infallible vision not merely into the divine essence, but 
into  the  essence  of  creation  and  every  phase  of  that 
process  as  well.  This  type  of  empiricism  is  theosophy, 
which  is  predominantly  a  speculative  or  theoretical 
mysticism.
48 
 
Böhme’s  writings  exhibit  “the  inherently  laudable  aspiration  to 
comprehend the emergence of things from God as an actual chain 
of events.”
49 
 
And yet, while the aspiration may be there, Schelling contends that 
Böhme  ultimately  fails  to  fulfill  it.  Here  the  standard  German 
Idealist  critique  of  mysticism  continues  to  play  its  part  (Böhme 
lacks  a  rigorous  method  and  so  is  plagued  by  the  problem  of 
articulation),  but  it  is  now  obviously  insufficient—for  the  aim  of 
positive philosophy is precisely to throw off the burden of scientific 
rigour in the name of ecstasy. Schelling now seems to want to be a 
mystic. As such, his most substantial criticisms end up proceeding 
in a very different direction. 
  Namely, Böhme fails to encounter God as actual in ecstasy 
because he remains in thrall to logic and rationalism. Böhme is still 
too  scientific,  too  philosophical.  Despite  its  appearance  to  the 
contrary, Böhme’s vision of God is too mediated to serve as a model 
for Schellingian positive philosophy:  
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We have advanced theosophy primarily as the antithesis 
of  rational  philosophy,  and  thus  of  rationalism  in 
philosophy.  Yet  at  bottom  theosophy  strives  to  move 
beyond rationalism without, however, being capable of 
actually  wresting  away  rationalism’s  substantial 
knowledge. . . Theosophy wants of course to overcome 
such  a  knowledge,  but  it  does  not  succeed,  as  is  seen 
most  clearly  with  Böhme.  .  .  Although  he  calls  it 
theosophy, thus making the claim to be the science of the 
divine, the content to which theosophy attains remains 
only a substantial movement, and he presents God only 
in a substantial movement.
50 
 
What separates theosophy from positive philosophy, Schelling now 
contends, is the remnant of abstract logical thought in theosophical 
speculation: 
 
What  in  particular  lies  at  the  heart  of  Jakob  Böhme’s 
theosophy  is  the  inherently  laudable  aspiration  to 
comprehend  the  emergence  of  things  from  God  as  an 
actual chain of events. Jakob Böhme, however, does not 
know  of  any  other  way  to  bring  this  about  than  by 
invoking the deity itself in a type of natural process. The 
characteristic feature of the positive philosophy, however, 
consists precisely in that it rejects all processes taken in 
this sense, namely in which God would not only be the 
logical  but  also  the  actual  result  of  a  process.  To  this 
extent,  the  positive  philosophy  is  more  properly 
speaking  in  direct  opposition  with  each  and  every 
theosophical aspiration.
51 
 
The question is therefore why Böhme fails to escape thought, logic 
and  rationalism.  And  Schelling’s  answer  is  basically  Kantian: 
Böhme wants an immediate experience of God, but no experience 
of the divine can ever be immediate. There is no “raw,” naïve or 
immediate experience of an external entity and so Böhme’s raid on 
immediacy  must  necessarily—even  if  surreptitiously—involve 
mediacy. It is Böhme’s appeal to experience which is the problem, 
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because experience, Schelling insists, can never resist entirely the 
activity  of  reason.  Experience  is  ineluctably  logical,  and  so  the 
mystic  remains  forever  alienated  from  the  actuality  of  the 
theogonic process, consigned to a merely conceptual vision of this 
genesis. Böhme’s claim to “immediate experience” still smuggles in 
mediacy. 
 
So,  Schelling  contends,  a  different  method  is  required  than  that 
which  mystics  employ.  Ecstasis  must  be  cultivated  in  a  different 
way,  a  way  that  avoids  appeal  to  experience.  Philosophy  must 
therefore begin from what exceeds or what is above experience, with “a 
being  that  is  absolutely  external  to  thought  .  .  .  beyond  all 
experience as it is before all thought.”
52 However, of course, for a 
Kantian  (like  the  late  Schelling),  what  is  outside  the  realm  of 
possible  experience  is  inaccessible  to  the  human  subject.  In 
consequence, indirection is required to bring about human access to 
what exceeds experience. In other words, Schelling develops an art 
of ecstasy: in place of the mystic’s blunt, direct appeal to immediacy, 
he  develops  a  strategic  approach  to  the  transcendent.  The 
immediate is not (pace Böhme) immediately available, rather it is 
only  to  be  obtained  as  a  result  of  the  mediacy  of  feints  and 
diversions. 
  In 1833, the speculative mirror was invoked as a means of 
making experience conceptual: only when immediate experience 
reflects itself in a mirror can it attain true rigour and be labelled 
knowledge. In 1842, Schelling appeals to this mirror once again; 
however, it is for precisely the opposite reason: mediation is no 
longer a way of transforming vision into thought, but of escaping 
thought into vision. The speculative mirror is invoked for the sake 
of the unthought. An immediate vision of God as he actually is is 
only available via mediation. 
  To return to the terms of my Introduction, the immediacy of 
the  mystic  vision  is  to  be  safeguarded  by  posterior  exercises  in 
mediation. But, of course, in the terms of my Introduction, this is 
still to uphold something like an idealist fiction in which the initial 
moment of vision is still given immediately. That is, in his writings 
on Böhme (both On the History of Modern Philosophy and Lectures on 
the  Philosophy  of  Revelation),  Schelling  neglects  the  mediation 
necessary  to  obtain  that  moment  of  vision  to  begin  with.  He 
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neglects  those  crucial  exercises  that  transform  the  mystic  into  a 
person able to have such visions. The genesis of the mystical form 
of life eludes him. A symptom of this can be located in Schelling’s 
violent oscillations between conceiving Böhme as a fanatic (On the 
History  of  Modern  Philosophy)  and  as  a  Hegelian  (Lectures  on  the 
Philosophy  of  Revelation).  To  even  attempt  to  position  mysticism 
stably on the rational/irrational axis might itself seem misplaced
53; 
granting its possibility, however, such positioning still assumes too 
much—namely, that the rationality of Böhme’s mystical texts can be 
classified with respect to two components alone: (a) the immediacy 
of his visions and (b) the problem of articulation attendant upon 
subsequently describing them. What is missing here is any account 
of the processes by which the visions are themselves generated and 
the  implications  of  that  for  positioning  Böhme  on  the 
rational/irrational axis. 
To see what such an account might in fact looks like, as well 
as  its  significance  for  both  Schelling’s  encounter  with  mysticism 
and his own characterisation of speculation, one must turn to Clara.  
 
4. SIMULATING SUICIDE WITH CLARA 
Emanuel Swedenborg’s Heaven and Hell opens as a project in 
scriptural exegesis. In the Preface, Swedenborg rails against those 
who understand the words of Scripture merely “according to their 
literal  meaning.”
54  The  genuinely  religious  act  of  reading  goes 
beyond literalism to plumb “the hidden depths that lie within the 
details of the Word.”
55 There is a spiritual meaning as well—and the 
purpose of Heaven and Hell, according to Swedenborg in these first 
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few pages, is to reveal this spiritual significance and so make us 
better readers. Yet, there immediately arises a skeptical rejoinder 
to this project: why should we trust Swedenborg? What guarantees 
his dogmatic assertion of these “pure correspondences” hidden in 
the  biblical  text  for  which  “every  detail  points  to  something 
spiritual”
56?  The  answer  is  given  casually,  in  passing  almost: 
Swedenborg  is  so  sure  because  he  has  been  granted  immediate 
experience of the spirit world of heaven and hell: “I have also been 
enabled to see what is in heaven and in hell, a process that has 
been  going  on  for  thirteen  years.  Now  I  am  being  allowed 
therefore to describe what I have heard and seen.”
57 There is no 
doubting the correspondences in the Bible, for they are confirmed 
by  what  Swedenborg  has  seen  with  his  own  eyes.  This  passing 
remark  reorients  the  whole  project  of  Heaven  and  Hell:  only 
minimally  an  exercise  in  scriptural  hermeneutics,  it  is  rather 
dominated  by  accounts  of  Swedenborg’s  discussions  with  angels 
and observations of heaven’s geography. For example, he famously 
gives the following description of angelic town-planning: 
 
Whenever I have talked with angels face to face, I have 
been with them in their houses. Their houses were just 
like the houses on earth that we call homes, but more 
beautiful. They have chambers, suites, and bedrooms in 
abundance and courtyards with gardens, flowerbeds, and 
lawns around them. Where there is some concentration 
of people, the houses are adjoining, one near another, 
arranged in the form of a city with streets and lanes and 
public squares, just like the ones we see in cities on earth. 
I  have  been  allowed  to  stroll  along  them  and  look 
around  wherever  I  wished,  at  times  entering  people’s 
homes. This has happened when I was fully awake, with 
my inner sight opened.
58 
 
  What is most significant for present purposes is Swedenborg’s 
attempt in the Preface to Heaven and Hell (and this is illustrative of 
his whole oeuvre) to present his project as both hermeneutically 
sophisticated and empirically naïve. The accounts he puts forward 
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arise  from  both  a  delicate  process  of  textual  archaeology  and  a 
simple  act  of  sensing  what  is  immediately  accessible. 
Swedenborgian  mysticism  partakes  in  both  immediacy  and 
mediacy;  indeed, I want to contend in what follows that at one 
moment in his philosophical trajectory Swedenborgian mysticism 
represents  for  Schelling  an  ideal,  precisely  owing  to  the 
indifference  of  immediacy  and  mediacy  productive  of  the 
speculative standpoint. Swedenborg attains immediate access to the 
great  outdoors  of  the  spirit  world  without  succumbing  to  the 
theosophical  temptation  to  silence  and  the  renunciation  of 
language. 
 
Schelling’s  unfinished  novel,  Clara,  is  haunted  by  Swedenborg’s 
achievements. Indeed, it ends with an exposition of “the northern 
visionary’s” doctrine of revelation—an exposition which leaves the 
characters with a warm glow of “the greatest joy.”
59 What is more, 
the  very  climax  of  the  third  dialogue—the  novel’s  heart  and 
ground—makes reference to Swedenborg once again:  
 
Truly anyone who dared to speak authoritatively about 
this  [spirit]  world  would  have  to  have  died  and  come 
back  to  this  life  from  the  other  side,  like  Plato’s 
Armenian, or must have had his inner being opened to 
him in some other way so that he could look into that 
world, as happened to that Swedish visionary.
60 
 
Swedenborg is here presented as an ideal figure, since he achieved 
the  near-impossible:  he  experienced  the  spirit  world  without 
having to die (as is the case for most of us, even Plato’s Armenian) 
without even (and this will become increasingly important) falling 
asleep or being hypnotised. Swedenborg saw the heavens “when I 
was fully awake, with my inner sight opened.”
61 
  For the Schelling of Clara, this is the very condition to which 
the philosopher aspires. The spirit world is that aspect of reality in 
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which the ideal potency (the potency of mind, the ethical and the 
religious) is at its most intense.
62 To fulfill the speculative aim of 
philosophically accounting for everything (thereby bringing the 
system  to  totality),  the  spirit  world  must  be  included  as  well. 
Philosophers need to provide accounts of the spirit world, like 
Swedenborg—and  ideally  philosophers  would  provide  such 
accounts based  on an immediate experience that  can  be  clearly 
articulated without falsification, again like Swedenborg. The task 
for philosophers is, then, to become Swedenborg. 
  Hence, the whole of Clara is oriented around this problem: 
how can the living (and, in particular, living philosophers) come to 
know  the  spirit  world?  The  model  of  death  is  one  particularly 
powerful  answer  given  throughout  the  novel,  since  dying  is,  of 
course, the most popular means of attaining access to this realm of 
reality.
63 What is at stake for an absolute philosophy that accounts 
for the spirit world is  the  simulation  of  death  (achieving  precisely 
what death does but while  conscious). As Schelling puts it,  “He 
who loves wisdom will work towards death even here.”
64 So, each 
of  the  five  dialogues  in  Clara  sets  out  conditions  for  the 
accomplishment of the Swedenborgian ideal—that is, practical ways 
to die in life and so imitate the mystical text. 
  The first dialogue, for instance, interrogates the possibilities 
and dangers of organised religion for this end. Clara opens with a 
presentation of Catholic festivities on All Souls Day as a symbolic 
means of communing with the dead:  
 
We  saw  a  crowd  of  people  thronging  toward  a  gentle 
incline . . . We  joined them so that  for once  we, too, 
could watch the moving festival dedicated to the dead 
that is celebrated this day in Catholic towns. We found 
the whole area full of people already. It was peculiar to 
see life on the graves, forebodingly illuminated by the 
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dully shining autumn sun. As we left the trodden path, 
we soon saw pretty groups gathered around individual 
graves:  here  girls  in  their  bloom,  holding  hands  with 
their  younger  brothers  and  sisters,  crowned  their 
mother’s grave; there at the grave of her children lost so 
young  a  mother  stood  in  silence  with  no  need  for 
consecrated water to represent her tears . . . Here all of 
life’s  severed  relationships  were  revived  for  the 
spectators  who  were  familiar  with  the  people  and  the 
circumstances;  brothers  came  again  to  brothers  and 
children to parents; at this moment all were one family 
again.
65 
 
Schelling’s  interest  in  the  philosophical  potentialities  of  the 
religious  community  was  long-standing:  his  lectures  on  the 
Philosophy of Art end with an invocation of religious festivity.
66 And 
here again we read Schelling posit from the very beginning of 
Clara communal celebration as a means of attaining access to the 
spirit world. In a proto-Bakhtinian (but also very non-Bakhtinian!) 
manner, the festival becomes a site for the revelation of truth. 
  But it is seemingly not for everyone: none of the characters in 
the dialogue feel able to immerse themselves in the festival. The 
priest and doctor merely watch, while Clara has shut herself away 
in a Benedictine monastery. Such behaviour exemplifies what is, 
for  Schelling,  the  other,  equally  prevalent  face  of  organised 
religion: ascesis. Religion often prescribes collective immersion in 
the name of truth, but often it prescribes solitary withdrawal—and 
Schelling is insistent that such ascetic withdrawal from the world 
(whether physical in Clara’s case or intellectual in the case of the 
idealist philosopher) is precisely what impedes access to the spirit 
world. Ascesis is the danger which must be avoided. Such dangers 
are  embodied  in  the  “well-educated,  young  clergyman”
67  who 
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appears in this opening dialogue: his disconnection from the world 
and  subsequent  inability  to  recognise  any  positive  connection 
between it and the next results in disparaging comments on the 
festival and ultimately in a sterile, pseudo-Kantian agnosticism. So, 
when the narrator comments, “We should support all festivals and 
customs in which we are reminded of a connection with the world 
beyond,” the clergyman responds:  
 
Today’s  commemoration  certainly  has  something 
moving about it; however, if its purpose is to support the 
thought that we can be connected to the inhabitants of 
that other world, then I would hold this commemoration 
to be one that is almost detrimental and I would submit 
that it be abolished in your church . . . We must honour 
these old divisions.
68 
 
It is to such comments that Clara responds with the voice of both 
speculation  and  mysticism:  “What  do  cold  words  and  merely 
negative concepts have to do with ardent longing? Are we satisfied 
in this life with a bleak existence?”
69 
An alternative is required, and this alternative must provide a 
means of accessing the spirit world without renouncing this one. It 
is with this aim in view that the discussion turns to philosophy as a 
form of worldly curiosity. Philosophising serves as an antidote to 
ascesis: “Merely exercising piety as a way of life, without combining 
it with lively and active scientific research, leads to emptiness.”
70 
Indeed,  this  is  a  theme  which  resurfaces  again  and  again  in 
Schelling’s philosophy: knowledge of higher things (God, freedom, 
the mind) does not come at the expense of the lower. Schelling 
repeatedly  berates  those  philosophical  ascetics  who  indulge  in 
ethereal  but  ultimately  vacuous  considerations  of  the  spiritual. 
Hence, in  the 1809  Freiheitsschrift he  attacks  “dreary and fanatic 
enthusiasm  which  breaks  forth  in  self-mutilation  or  .  .  .  in  self-
emasculation” and “which in philosophy is accomplished by the 
                                                                                                               
68  Ibid.,  12.  The  clergyman  closely  mimics  Kant’s  own  assessment  of 
speculative  mysticism  in  the  closing  pages  of  Dreams  of  a Spirit-Seer  (in 
Theoretical  Philosophy  1755-1770,  ed.  and  trans.  David  Walford 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992], 2:367-73). On Schelling’s 
familiarity with Dreams, see Horn, Schelling and Swedenborg, 11. 
69 Ibid., 13. 
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renunciation of reason and science.”
71 Similar sentiments are to be 
found in the Introduction to  Clara as well: “Modern philosophy 
did away with its immediate reference to nature, or didn’t think to 
keep  it,  and  proudly  scorned  any  connection  to  physics. 
Continuing with its claims to the higher world, it was no longer 
metaphysics but hyperphysics.”
72 
  This  is  also  a  theme  emphasised  in  the  second  dialogue: 
becoming-Swedenborg  (knowledge  of  the  ideal  in  its  highest 
potentiation) can only occur by way of the natural sciences. It is this 
point that the character of the doctor presses home to Clara, so as 
to  counteract  her  flight  to  the  monastery.  Naturphilosophie  is  a 
necessary  precondition  for  being  a  speculative  philosopher.  He 
begins in the first dialogue, “No one should devote themselves to 
this investigation [of the spirit world] until they have gained a firm 
and solid ground here, within nature, on which they can base their 
thoughts . . . Not ‘top down’ but ‘bottom up’ is my motto.”
73 And 
he then continues in the second dialogue:  
 
They [the ascetics] start with what is most general and 
spiritual and are thereby never able  to come down to 
reality or particulars. They are ashamed to start from the 
earth, to climb up from the creature as if from a rung on 
a  ladder,  to  draw  those  thoughts  that  are  beyond  the 
senses first from earth, fire, water and air. And so they 
don’t  get  anywhere,  either:  their  webs  of  thought  are 
plants without roots, they don’t hang onto anything.
74 
 
Knowledge of what is higher must be mediated (reflected) by what 
is  lower.  This  is  our  first  clue  to  Schelling’s  philosophical 
reconstruction of the Swedenborgian mirror: it involves impurity—
the mixing of realms and sciences. As we shall see, this impurity 
informs the Schellingian definition of dialectic. 
Let me temporarily skip the third dialogue and turn to the final 
two.  Here  the  problem  of  articulation  that  so  worried  Schelling 
                                                                                                               
71 F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom, 
trans. James Gutmann (La Salle: Open Court, 1936), 31. 
72  Schelling,  Clara,  3.  See  further  ibid.,  4-5.  Whether  this  introductory 
piece was actually intended as an introduction to Clara or not is a matter 
of debate (see Steinkamp’s notes to these passages). 
73 Ibid., 15. 
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with respect to Böhme takes centre-stage once again—that is, if the 
philosopher  is  able  to  attain  experience  of  the  spirit  world  by 
following the rules set out in the earlier dialogues, there remains 
the  problem  of  transforming  such  immediate  experience  into 
knowledge and subsequently into a textual artefact. This is again to 
insist  on  indifferentiating  between  immediacy  and  mediacy  to 
achieve  the  speculative  standpoint:  the  philosopher  attains  the 
great  outdoors  only  through  mirroring  it.  Further  practices  and 
exercises  must  be  prescribed  for  the  philosopher  to  turn 
experience into cognition and text. 
  The fourth dialogue thus gives rules on the manufacture of a 
speculative  text.  This  is  of  course  somewhat  of  a  performative 
exercise, since the rules Schelling sets out for the amelioration of 
philosophical writing are precisely those meant to be embodied in 
Clara itself. So, the fourth dialogue begins: 
 
At about the same time, a few days or weeks or so later, 
a  philosophy  book  arrived  in  which  some  of  the 
excellent things it contained were written in a completely 
incomprehensible language and abounded, so to speak, 
with  barbarism.  Clara  found  it  on  my  table  and  after 
she’d  read  it  for  a  while,  she  said:  Why  do  today’s 
philosophers find it so impossible to write at least a little 
in  the  same  way  that  they  speak?  Are  these  terribly 
artificial words absolutely necessary, can’t the same thing 
be said in a more natural way, and does a book have to 
be quite unenjoyable for it to be philosophical?
75 
 
In place of this arid and alienating jargon, Clara and the priest 
agree that philosophical works should tend to “the language of the 
people”  and  even  the  language  of  the  lover;  they  should  be 
dialogues, dramatizing a debate to “make it live before our very 
eyes”;  and  they  should  respect  the  Aristotelian  unity  of  action 
(something that Clara—as a novel—does not do).
76 
  These rules are further grounded in a discussion of the nature 
of language in the fifth dialogue. Language itself possesse s the 
potential for bearing witness to both the natural world and the 
spirit  world,  for  it  “contains  a  spiritual  essence  and  a  corporeal 
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element.”
77  Language  is  both  a  physical  entity  (sound/graphic 
mark) and an ideal one (meaning): it oscillates between nature and 
spirit.  Indeed,  Schelling  mentions  examples  where  language  has 
become the medium through which to attain occult experience of 
the spirit world:  
 
Certain strange cases that cannot be gainsaid are told of 
people  in  conditions  of  rapture  coming  to  understand 
languages of which they had no prior knowledge, even 
of their coming to speak in other tongues, as the apostles 
once did. It would follow from this that in all languages, 
particularly in the original ones, something of the initial 
element’s purity is still to be found.
78 
 
Such sentiments are repeated in the 1811 Report on Schmid’s Attempt 
at  Pasigraphy  where  once  again  the  depths  of  language  are 
foregrounded as the key tool for an occult heightening of the self:  
 
We  know  of  a  quantity  of  cases  where  people  in  a 
somnambulant  condition  have  produced  poetry  which 
they were never again able to produce in a wakeful state 
. . . In the Actis Naturae Curiosum there is the story of a 
woman who in the condition of pregnancy fell into an 
ecstasy in which she sang unknown songs and talked in 
foreign tongues . . . All this is surely sufficient to prove 
that the source of language lies in man and, like so much 
else  which  hides  in  him,  emerges  more  freely  under 
certain  circumstances  and  is  developed  into  a  higher, 
more universal sense of language.
79 
 
  Hence,  language  performs  the  very  ideal  of  Schellingian 
speculation  in  Clara:  it  approaches  the  spirit  world  without 
renouncing the real and the natural. To speak is to deny the power 
of the ascetic ideal (and here emerges the germ  of a  critique of 
                                                                                                               
77 Ibid., 72. 
78 Ibid., 72-3. 
79 Schelling, Werke, 8:450-1. When we turn to the discussion of the occult 
in the third dialogue, this linguistic backdrop needs to be borne in mind. 
Language forms the basis of occult experience and the oscillation of the 
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apophaticism).  What  is  more,  this  account  of  the  ontology  of 
language also throws light on Schelling’s attack on artificial jargon 
in  the  fourth  dialogue.  The  resources  for  good  philosophy  are 
already present in language as it is; there is no need to remould it 
in  the  scientific  image.  The  linguistic  barbarians  attacked  in  the 
fourth  dialogue  are  similar  to  the  ascetics  Schelling  likewise 
condemns:  both  renounce  the  everyday  and  the  real,  thereby 
concealing,  rather  than  revealing,  the  truth.  The  invention  of  a 
philosophical language is a redundant gesture; the language of the 
people  already  possesses  speculative  potential.
80  Therefore, 
Schelling’s linguistic concerns are pragmatic: setting rules for the 
concrete situations in which language can best be employed and its 
potential mined. Specifically, the speculative ideal is effectuated in 
a language of sympathy, “a heavenly appearance even here”
81 in 
which the materiality of the sign is not renounced but perfected.
82 
And this incorporation of sympathy into the speculative should not 
surprise us, for speculation is the overcoming of opposition for 
identity—the  very  same  dynamic  exhibited  by  a  sympathetic 
understanding. Sympathy—and in particular a sympathetic use of 
language—is the speculative affect par excellence.
83 
 
It is in the third dialogue that the characters tackle the project of 
becoming-Swedenborg  most  explicitly.  While  the  first  two 
dialogues set out some general philosophical prerequisites for this 
end and the last two (posterior) practices for manufacturing a text 
that manages to capture experience of the spirit world in linguistic 
form, it is the third dialogue which directly takes on the challenge 
of  specifying  those  pre-philosophical  exercises  by  which  a  full 
                                                                                                               
80 In the contemporaneous Stuttgart Seminars, Schelling affirms the maxim, 
vox populi vox Dei. F.W.J. Schelling, Stuttgart Seminars in Idealism and the 
Endgame  of  Theory:  Three  Essays,  ed.  and  trans.  Thomas  Pfau  (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1994), 237. 
81 Schelling, Clara, 72. 
82 So, Schelling speaks of “communication without signs via an invisible, 
but perhaps nevertheless physical, influence” (ibid., 73). And once again 
the amorous relation becomes a philosophical model. 
83 For more on the affect of sympathy in Schelling’s philosophy and its 
relation to his rhetorical practice, see Joshua Ramey and Daniel Whistler, 
“The Physics of Sense:  Bruno, Schelling, Deleuze” in  Gilles  Deleuze and 
Metaphysics,  eds.  Alain  Beaulieu,  Edward  Kazarian  and  Julia  Sushytska 
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experience  of  the  spirit  world  is  made  possible.  Moreover,  as  I 
have already intimated, the characters realise that such exercises 
must be modelled on death, for it is through dying that this spirit 
world is typically reached. Speculative philosophers must simulate 
suicide  to  know  all  of  reality—and  the  third  dialogue  sets  about 
identifying how. Such a concern with suicide should not be read as 
a  “mystic  aberration”  in  Schelling’s  trajectory.  An  insistence  on 
killing the self in order to philosophise is a recurrent one in his 
oeuvre.  For  example,  it  is  crucial  to  the  methodology  of 
Naturphilosophie:  the  process  of  abstraction  by  which  philosophy 
begins consists in an artificial annihilation of the conscious self: “I 
had to extract the I from its own intuition . . . to posit the I as 
unconscious; but the I, to the extent it is unconscious, is not = the 
I.”
84 The philosopher must suppress the I to know nature, and it is 
only a short step from asserting that unconsciousness is a necessary 
prerequisite for philosophising to an interest in employing occult 
practices for such an end. 
  There is a moment each of us experiences on the verge of 
sleep, the characters speculate, that gives rise to an unconscious 
lucidity:  
 
At  the  moment  of  falling  into  one’s  final  slumber,  an 
indescribable joy flows from one’s entire being, and here 
the soul is in its finest moral and spiritual activity at the 
same time . . . This mid-condition between waking and 
sleeping . . . is so infinitely different from anything that 
we call a dream that its clarity surpasses even the most 
                                                                                                               
84 Schelling, Werke, 4:88. For an analysis of similar claims made in the 
early Critical Letters, see Alberto Toscano, “Fanaticism and Production: On 
Schelling’s Philosophy of Indifference,” Pli 8 (1999). To make explicit the 
contemporary  stakes  of  this  discussion,  c.f.  Brassier’s  insistence  on  the 
question,  “How  does  thought  think  the  death  of  thought?”—namely  for 
genuinely  nihilistic  thought  of  the  outside  to  occur,  “the  subject  of 
philosophy must [somehow] recognise that he or she is already dead.” Ray 
Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), 223, 239. As I have argued, the Schellingian suicidal 
exercises that form a speculative life are preparatory to the description of a 
realm outside of human life. What they make possible, to quote the final 
words of Thacker’s After Life, is “to think a concept of life that is itself, in 
some basic way, unhuman, a life without us” (Eugene Thacker, After Life 
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010], 268). GLOSSATOR 7 
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vivid waking thoughts, and any normal mode of existing 
seems to be only a dream . . . Everything is differentiated 
in  detail  and  is  completely  without  confusion.  This 
condition,  however,  usually  lasts  only  a  second;  it 
disappears in a sudden, shuddering movement.
85 
 
Such a moment of “waking sleep”
86 is death-like to the extent that 
death is itself the “last sleep” in which “those who have escaped 
sleep from within sleep . . . have thereby penetrated through to a 
waking state.”
87 Yet it is available to the living. This leads the priest 
to affirm the maxim: “Only he who could do while awake what he 
has to do while asleep would be the perfect philosopher.”
88 The 
third  dialogue  revolves  around  the  ideal  of  conscious 
unconsciousness, death-in-life. 
  However, as Clara makes clear, if such a moment of dreaming 
lucidity  is  experienced  at  all,  it  “lasts  a  second”  and  then 
“disappears  in  a  sudden,  shuddering  moment.”  The  task  for  a 
speculative  philosopher,  therefore,  is  to  artificially  produce, 
reproduce and prolong this moment at will. It is here that she must 
appeal  to  occult  practices  and  other  “mysterious  phenomena,”
89 
such as hypnosis, since this moment of conscious unconsciousness 
is to be identified with the state of clairvoyance cultivated by the 
occult.  Hypnosis  is  a  strategy  to  effectuate  “the  highest 
clairvoyance.”
90 Thus, Schelling describes the workings of hypnosis 
as follows:  
 
Through the influence  of other people, human beings, 
acting  as  if  dead  toward  everything  apart  from  the 
influencer,  and  with  their  external  senses  completely 
deadened,  can  pass  over  into  an  internal  clarity  of  the 
highest kind . . . If this is true, then I believe that here we 
would have the experience of a condition that we could 
justifiably call a higher one and that we could consider to 
be  a  wakeful  sleep  or  a  sleeping  wakefulness.  And  I 
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86 Ibid., 73. 
87 Ibid., 47. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid., 48. 
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would  thereby  compare  it  not  to  death,  but  to  the 
condition that follows death, and one which I believe will 
be  the  highest  and  which  will  be  a  clairvoyance 
uninterrupted by a waking up.
91 
 
And yet the problem of articulation remains unsolved. In hypnosis, 
as in sleep and death, one ultimately loses consciousness and the 
experiences gained in a clair voyant state are rarely preserved in 
memory.  In  other  words,  the  above  still  does  not  amount  to 
becoming-Swedenborg,  for  Swedenborg  experienced  the  spirit 
world  “fully  awake,  with  my  inner  sight  opened.”  He  remembered 
every detail and was able to communicate it soberly in text after 
text. Hypnosis remains an approximation to this ideal: it fails to 
satisfactorily indifferentiate immediate experience and art.
92 
  For the Schelling of  Clara, this  is  the problem that  dialectic 
answers.  Dialectic  is  the  philosophical  tool  for  becoming-
Swedenborg; however, it achieves this parity with the mystical text 
precisely  by  abandoning  the  Swedenborgian  ideal  in  its  purity. 
Mysticism is only part of the story; instead, the philosopher must 
diversify  and  embrace  impurity—an  impurity  in  which  the 
philosopher  oscillates  or  (in  the  language  of  Clara)  “rotates” 
between  mystic  experience  and  concept-construction.
93  The 
rhythm of this rotation defines philosophical dialectic. Whereas the 
mystic is lucky enough to wholeheartedly purs ue her end, the 
philosopher must compromise and become composite. It is with 
this in mind that the priest insists on Clara pursuing conceptual 
clarity alongside spiritual ecstasis: 
                                                                                                               
91  Ibid.,  47-8;  my  emphases.  And  crucially  the  characters  add  that 
“approaching that higher sleep is very similar to approaching death.” Ibid., 
48. 
92 And so the doctor still insists in the third dialogue: “And yet . . . this 
condition [of clairvoyance] is still merely an approximation to the highest 
one” (ibid.). 
93 Ibid., 35. As is stated in the third dialogue, “What is delicate or spiritual 
receives its highest worth only by asserting its nature through mixing with a 
conflicting, even barbaric, element” (ibid., 77; my emphasis). Mixing is the 
formal criterion for Schellingian philosophy as a whole, see further Daniel 
Whistler, Schelling’s Theory of Symbolic Language: Forming the System of Identity 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 238-9; and, in reference to the 
novelistic style of Clara in particular, see Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and 
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What  [Clara]  lacked  was  the  ability  to  unpack  her 
thoughts  and  thereby  clarify  them.  I  know  what  an 
agreeable  effect  ordering  one’s  own  thoughts  into  a 
precise  framework  has;  the  soul  is  happy  when  it  can 
have what it felt inwardly, as if by inspiration or through 
some  divine  thought,  expressly  worked  out  in  the 
understanding, too, as if looking in a mirror.
94 
 
The speculative mirror reappears at the climax of Clara, once more 
as  the  culmination  of  philosophical  activity.  One  must  cultivate 
and  ameliorate  one’s  experience  until  it  is  “as  if  looking  in  a 
mirror.”  Speculation  is  only  attained  once  the  immediacy  of 
experience has passed through the rigours of an art of immediacy. 
Such  a  process  does  not  destroy  immediacy;  it  makes  the 
philosophical  presentation  of  it  possible.  Ultimately,  the 
speculative mirror potentiates, not annihilates, the mystic vision of 
the spirit world. 
 
5. DEATH AND/OR THE DIALECTIC 
Schelling is a philosopher of mediated immediacy; Schelling 
is a philosopher of the dialectic; Schelling is a philosopher who 
conceives  death-like  negation  as  a  necessary  moment  in 
philosophising.  And  yet  Schelling  is  not  a  Hegelian  philosopher. 
The  common  search  for  the  speculative  standpoint  connects 
Hegelian and Schellingian thinking, but once on their quest each 
embarks on a series of idiosyncratic experiments in the silvering of 
mirrors. German Idealism does not consist in a linear narrative; it 
does not posit one definitive orthodoxy and various alternatives to 
it.  German  Idealism  is  entirely  constituted  by  non-standard 
speculations—the  manufacture  of  weird  and  wonderful  looking-
glasses.  For  Schelling,  mystical  traditions  form  much  of  the 
material  out  of  which  such  mirrors  are  silvered.  Böhmean 
theosophy is such a crucial dialogue partner precisely because of 
what it lacks—a mirror adequate to its visions of God. Swedenborg, 
however, forges his own mirror—“a magical and symbolic mirror” 
that perfectly produces the indifference of mediacy and immediacy 
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characteristic of the speculative standpoint. The philosopher strives 
in  vain  to  replicate  this  Swedenborgian  miracle.  Ultimately  and 
belatedly, she must choose between two inferior substitutes—death 
or the dialectic. 
 
In  the Introduction, I suggested that at issue  in the  language  of 
speculation and reflection pulsing through Hegel and Schelling’s 
work is the type of mirroring activity to which thoughts, feelings 
and visions are to be subjected. Such mediation must manage to 
keep  the  philosopher  face  to  face  with  her  material,  free  from 
falsification. Moreover, implicitly for Hegel and very explicitly (as 
I have argued) for Schelling, this question of the kind of mirror to 
be silvered leads directly to an interrogation of the very personality 
of the philosopher herself. The art of immediacy emerges out of a 
speculative  form  of  life—those  pre-philosophical,  pre-textual 
practices  that  make  one  a  speculative,  rather  than  a  reflective 
philosopher.  What  is  more,  the  preceding  has  shown  the 
significance of mystical forms of life for Schelling’s depiction of the 
speculative philosopher. 
  The  question  is,  therefore,  not  merely:  who  dares  to  face 
experience in a mirror—the philosopher or the mystic (as Schelling 
asks of Böhme)? Nor is it merely: which of them silvers a mirror 
capable of bearing the glare of experience? But more critically still: 
who are these philosophers and mystics—what breed of silverer are 
they? Schelling confronts the mystic with the challenge: who are 
you to do what you do?—just as we must challenge Schelling. And 
as a result of this challenge, he goes on to appropriate much from 
the mystic, even if (as is always the case in Schelling’s post-1809 
output) such appropriation is channelled through indirections and 
feints. Schelling learns from the mystic’s failure, from the mystic’s 
inimitable success, as well as from what can still be imitated. He 
plunders the mystical text, as he plundered vocabularies, styles and 
concepts throughout his career. Schelling’s systematic eclecticism 
devours  everything  in  the  formation  of  the  absolute  system.  He 
leaves  nothing  out—the  mystical  text  included.
95  The  impure 
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mixture of the Schellingian dialectic is emblematic of this, cobbling 
together  mystic  intuition,  conceptual  analysis  and  scientific 
experimentation. 
  And yet in Clara the dialectic is only invoked under a veil of 
melancholy as an inferior surrogate for those neither inspired by 
mystic vision nor brave enough to die. In the wake of Caroline’s 
death, Schelling surveys the prospects for those unlucky enough to 
have no sustained connection to the departed (whether in life, like 
Swedenborg, or though death)
96 and what remains is the dialectic. 
So,  for  the  sake  of  the  absolute  system  (and  so  the  rational 
reconstruction  of  the  spirit  world),  the  philosopher  must 
mournfully and regretfully carry on salvaging the scattered shards 
of mysticism. 
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